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Note
GRIFFIN v. STATE: SETTING THE BAR TOO HIGH FOR
AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE
BRENDAN W. HOGAN ∗
In Griffin v. State, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that a
printout from a MySpace page, offered to demonstrate that a witness
had been threatened into providing inaccurate testimony at an earlier
trial, was not properly authenticated at trial because, despite the fact
that the printout contained identifying characteristics the lower
courts found sufficient for authentication, 2 the risk of “manipulation . . . by someone other than [the] purported creator and/or user”
was too great to allow the printout into evidence. 3 This holding improperly distinguished social media evidence from other forms of
electronic evidence and suggested an artificially high authentication
threshold for social media evidence presented at trial. 4 The court further erred in creating a higher standard for authentication of social
media evidence by stating a non-exclusive list of three means for authentication, because neither the plain text of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence nor traditional authentication procedures support such a
system. 5 The court should have affirmed the lower court ruling that
the evidence was admissible because the prosecution met its burden
of proof and showed that the evidence was what it was purported to
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1. 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415 (2011).
2. Griffin v. State, 192 Md. App. 518, 544, 995 A.2d 791, 807 (2010), rev’d, 419 Md.
343, 19 A.3d 415 (2011).
3. Griffin, 419 Md. at 348, 357–58, 19 A.3d at 418, 424.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.

61

62

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[Vol. 71:61

be; the defense offered no evidence to rebut this presumption. 6
I. THE CASE
Early in the morning of April 24, 2005, Darvell Guest was shot
seven times in the women’s bathroom of Ferrari’s Bar in Perryville,
Maryland. 7 Antoine Levar Griffin was charged with the murder and
subsequently tried for the first time in August 2006. 8 At the first trial,
Griffin’s cousin, and an eyewitness to the murder, Dennis Gibbs, “testified that [he] did not see [Griffin] pursue the victim into the bathroom with a gun.” 9 The first trial ended in a mistrial and Griffin was
retried in January 2008. 10
At the second trial, Gibbs testified again. 11 This time, however,
other witnesses stated that Griffin did pursue Guest into the bathroom
and Gibbs testified that Griffin and Guest were the only other individuals in the bathroom at the time the shots were fired. 12 Gibbs
stated that he lied in the first trial because he had been threatened by
Griffin’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, before the start of the first trial. 13
To prove that Barber had threatened Gibbs before the first trial,
the prosecution offered a printout from a MySpace profile page allegedly belonging to Barber. 14 The page contained the statement:
“JUST REMEMBER, SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO
YOU ARE!!” 15 The State introduced this evidence to corroborate
Gibbs’s contention that he had been threatened. 16 The MySpace profile was in the name of “SISTASOULJAH,” but the State contended
that it belonged to Ms. Barber. 17 The printout contained biographical data indicating that the author was a 23-year-old female from Port
Deposit, Maryland, and listing the individual’s birthday as “10-2-83.”18
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. Griffin, 192 Md. App. at 523, 995 A.2d at 794.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 523–24, 995 A.2d at 794–95.
13. Id. at 524, 995 A.2d at 795.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 526–27, 995 A.2d at 796.
18. Id. at 526, 995 A.2d at 796. While the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion states the
printout identified the author as from “Fort Deposit,” Maryland, there is no Fort Deposit
in Maryland. The town is Port Deposit. The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, correctly
identified the town.
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The profile also contained a photo of an embracing couple, which all
parties agreed appeared to be Griffin and Barber. 19
The defense counsel objected to the printout, arguing that the
State had failed to sufficiently establish a “connection” to Barber, and
that it had failed to question her about the profile when she was on
the stand. 20 The prosecution asserted that the profile could be authenticated by Sgt. John Cook, whom the defense was permitted to
question through a voir dire exam outside the presence of the jury. 21
Sgt. Cook testified that he knew the profile page belonged to Barber
because of the picture of her and Griffin on the page, the reference
to their children, and the listed birth date. 22 The State also called
Barber to testify, during which time Barber said that she was dating
Griffin, who sometimes went by the nickname “Boozy,” and that Barber and Griffin lived together with their two children. 23 Barber, who
was called to testify by only the prosecution, was not asked about the
MySpace profile by either party. 24
The trial court admitted a redacted portion of one page of the
profile including the photo, “a description of the page creator as a 23
year-old female from Fort Deposit, and a portion of the” statement,
finding that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of
corroborating the threat Barber allegedly made to Gibbs. 25 The trial
court did not comment on the authenticity of the printout. 26 Without
waiving Griffin’s objection, defense counsel stipulated to a statement
about the authenticity of the printout in lieu of testimony from Sgt.
Cook. 27 The court reviewed the stipulation during jury instruction,
stating that “Sergeant Cook went online to the Web site My Space and
downloaded an entry there, the redacted version of which is in evidence, and that he would have testified that there was a photo there
of Miss Barber.” 28
The jury convicted Griffin of second degree murder, first degree
assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime
of violence in the fatal shooting of Darvell Guest on April 24, 2005. 29
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 526–27, 995 A.2d at 796.
Id. at 527, 995 A.2d at 796.
Id., 995 A.2d at 796–97.
Id., 995 A.2d at 797.
Id. at 526, 995 A.2d at 796.
Id. at 526–27, 529, 995 A.2d at 796, 798.
Id. at 527–29, 995 A.2d at 797–98.
Id.
Id. at 528, 995 A.2d at 797.
Id. at 529, 995 A.2d at 798.
Id. at 523, 995 A.2d at 794.
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Griffin appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals on the
grounds that the trial court erred in admitting the MySpace printout. 30 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling
that the evidence was properly admitted because the prosecution,
through the stipulated testimony provided by the police officer, had
provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the printout. 31 Griffin
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the state filed a conditional
cross appeal. 32
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the
trial court erred in admitting the MySpace printout and, if so, whether the error was reversible. 33
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The rapid growth and spread of new types of communication
technology in the past twenty years—cell phones, text messaging, online instant messaging programs, and social media—have prompted a
reevaluation of an often overlooked area of evidentiary law: authentication. 34 Maryland courts have had few opportunities to address the
authentication of electronic sources of evidence and have never before addressed the issue of social media evidence in the authentication context. 35 Authentication standards, however, have not changed
from their early common law origins—requiring only that the party
seeking to introduce the evidence establish by a preponderance of the
30. Id. The petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to incorrectly describe “reasonable doubt” in his rebuttal and that the trial court
erred in denying appellant’s request for a mistrial following an outburst by the mother of a
witness. Id. These arguments were not ultimately relevant to the final disposition of the
appeal as the court ruled against Griffin on his additional grounds for appeal. Id. at 548,
552, 995 A.2d at 809, 811.
31. Id. at 523, 543–44, 995 A.2d at 794, 806–07.
32. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 346–47, 19 A.3d 415, 417 (2011).
33. Id.
34. See generally Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American
Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42
AKRON L. REV. 357, 370–71 (2009) (noting that “[c]hat room and text or instant messaging ‘dialogues’ . . . pose unique challenges to authentication . . . .”).
35. See State v. Bryant 361 Md. 420, 422, 761 A.2d 925, 926 (2000) (determining the
authenticity of toxicology report under MD. R. 5-902); Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110,
118–19, 981 A.2d 666, 670–71 (2009) (determining the authenticity of a 911 emergency
call); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 237–38, 927 A.2d 32, 36 (2007) (discussing the
authenticity of text messages sent to the victim prior to her murder). See also Griffin, 192
Md. App. at 538, 995 A.2d at 803 (“Despite the pervasive popularity of social networking
sites and their potential as treasure troves of valuable evidence, Maryland appellate courts
have not yet addressed the issue of authenticating anonymous or pseudonymous documents printed from social media Web sites.”).
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evidence that the information is what its proponent claims it to be. 36
The same authentication standards that originated in the common
law and were codified by the Federal Rules of Evidence and, later, by
the Maryland Rules of Evidence have been applied to electronic
sources of evidence without modification. 37
A. Authentication Generally
The existence of specifically and individually codified authentication standards is a relatively new development in the history of Maryland law. 38 The basic purpose of authentication, however, has not
changed for centuries: the proponent of the evidence must, as a condition precedent to the evidence’s admission, demonstrate that the
evidence is what the proponent purports it to be. 39
Prior to the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1993,
the Maryland standard for authentication was based on common law,
state statutes, and court rules, 40 but following a trend which began in
the federal courts in the 1970s, the Maryland Court of Appeals opted
for a rules-based approach modeled on the success of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 41 The rules-based approach laid out in the Maryland Rules of Evidence has reduced the number of authentication
disputes warranting a written decision in Maryland. 42 Indeed, since
36. See infra Part II.A–B.
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L. REV. 1032, 1032 (1995) (discussing the adoption of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence).
39. Id. at 1078.
40. Id. at 1032.
41. See Adoption of New Title 5, Rules of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXIX (1993)
(Chasanow, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the new rules of evidence adopted by the
court, despite changes to “over 80%” of the rules, were “patterned after the Federal Rules
of Evidence”). The similarity between the state and federal rules is obvious when compared side-by-side. In fact, the wording of the rules is almost identical in many places.
Compare, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”) (emphasis added), with MD. R. 5-901(a) (“The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”) (emphasis added).
42. Only thirteen cases involving authentication have been decided by Maryland appellate courts since 1993. Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 28 A.3d 675 (2011); Washington v.
State, 406 Md. 642, 961 A.2d 1110 (2008); State v. Bryant, 361 Md. 420, 761 A.2d 925
(2000); Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Serv. v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996);
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 9 A.3d 99 (2010); Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110,
981 A.2d 666 (2009); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 927 A.2d 32 (2007); Wagner v.
State, 160 Md. App. 531, 864 A.2d 1037 (2005); Odum v. State, 156 Md. App. 184, 846
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the adoption of the new rules in 1993, Maryland’s appellate decisions
on authentication have dealt almost solely with applying the authentication rules to new types of technology, each of which applied authentication standards in the Maryland Rules of Evidence without
modification. 43
1. Development of Authentication Standards in Maryland Prior to
the Adoption of the Federal Model
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, Maryland used
statutory provisions, rules of practice, and common law precedent to
determine what evidence was admissible at trial. 44 Authentication
standards were not considered a separate area of law, but rather, the
authenticity of a piece of evidence, as well as its relevancy to the
charges or claims in the case, was considered as part of the foundation of the evidence. 45
Early authentication standards were relatively lax, only requiring
a prima facie showing that the evidence was what its proponent
claimed it to be. 46 Authenticity, similar to relevance, was therefore
treated as a threshold issue with the ultimate decision as to the believability and value of the evidence left to the jury. 47 Common law methods of authentication were generally divided into two groups: authentication by direct proof and authentication by circumstantial
A.2d 445 (2004), aff’d, 412 Md. 593, 989 A.2d 232 (2010); Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App.
54, 773 A.2d 1087 (2001); Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 768 A.2d 140 (2001); State v.
Brown, 129 Md. App. 517, 743 A.2d 262 (1999); Champion Billiards Cafe, Inc. v. Hall, 112
Md. App. 560, 685 A.2d 901 (1996).
43. See, e.g., Dickens, 175 Md. App. 231, 238–39, 927 A.2d 32, 36–37 (analyzing authenticity of several text messages and applying MD. R. 5-901). But see Clark v. State, 188 Md.
App. 110, 118–19 981 A.2d 666, 670 (2009) (applying MD. R. 5-901 and discussing the admissibility of a 911 emergency call, which was not a new technology in 2009).
44. Hornstein, supra note 38, at 1032.
45. See e.g., Camphor v. State, 233 Md. 203, 204–05, 196 A.2d 75, 75–76 (1963) (holding that evidence was admissible at trial without separately considering its authentication,
but discussing testimony which tended to show that the evidence was authentic).
46. See, e.g., Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 144, 195 A.2d 610, 611 (1963) (admitting a
store price tag as evidence of the price of the stolen object during a larceny trial after testimony from the store clerk stating that the tag would have been on the stolen item and a
finding that the tag was not inadmissible hearsay).
47. See Lauder, 233 Md. at 144, 195 A.2d at 611 (assuming a document to be authentic
when applying potential hearsay exceptions as a condition precedent to admissibility). See
also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE 395 (1954) (noting
the connection between authenticity and relevance); 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2128–29 (J.H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. rev. ed.
1978) (1901) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]; Edmund M. Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941–1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 490 (1946) (opining that disputes over authenticity
should be submitted to the jury).
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evidence. 48 Authentication by direct proof required either (1) testimony by a witness with personal knowledge of the creation of the
document (or knowledge of the “books of concern” for custodians of
business records) or (2) testimony by an individual familiar with the
handwriting of the purported author to confirm that the handwriting
on the document is the same as the handwriting of the purported author. 49 In contrast, authentication by circumstantial evidence could
be proven by a showing that (1) “a generation had passed since a
document was written” and the document is “unsuspicious in appearance;” 50 (2) the document was obtained from the custody of a public
official who would have such documents in the course of his regular
duties; 51 (3) the document in question was obtained from the custody
of a private person who is purported to be the author, if the court determined this was appropriate; 52 or (4) the letter or telephone message was a reply to an earlier conversation. 53
Maryland courts have generally addressed authentication issues
indirectly, treating the issue of authentication as a part of the broader
question of admissibility. For example, in Lauder v. State54 the Court
of Appeals held that the price tag on a stolen tape recorder was admissible as evidence showing the recorder’s value because the tag was
identified by a witness and was a business record rather than hearsay. 55 In some instances, the “trustworthiness”—a term used interchangeably with authentication—of a document was considered along
with possible hearsay exceptions as part of the same question of admissibility. 56 The development of authentication law in this manner
left no clear standards for courts to determine whether a piece of evi48. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at 398–406.
49. Id. at 398–401.
50. Id. at 401.
51. Id. at 403.
52. Propst v. State, 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968) (“We hold, however, that
the evidence was admissible as to Ruth Virginia May under the principle that writings taken from an accused pursuant to a lawful search are admissible without further proof of the
genuineness.”).
53. McCormick, supra note 47, at 404–05.
54. 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610 (1963).
55. Id. at 144, 195 A.2d at 611.
56. See, e.g., Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 562–63, 59 A.2d 325, 326 (1948) (holding a
receipt admissible where there was a statutory hearsay exception and it “would seem to
meet the tests of ‘necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness’”(quoting Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 639 (4th Cir. 1940)). See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The
Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 52
n.187 (1998) (noting that over time, in the context of photographic evidence, judges substituted tests looking to the trustworthiness of sources for strict authentication requirements).
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dence was “trustworthy” or “authentic,” leading to relatively lax standards for authentication. 57 Such lax standards were demonstrated in
Morrow v. State, 58 in which the Court of Appeals ruled that a receipt
was sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into trial where it was generated in the normal course of business and there was no evidence
that the receipt was not “trustworthy.” 59 These lax standards of authentication remain evident in the modern application of authentication rules. 60
2. The Process of Authentication at Trial
As a condition precedent to admissibility, the party seeking to
admit a document or other information into evidence must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the document or information is
authentic, and that information “is what its proponent claims.” 61
Some sources of evidence—such as government publications or
newspapers—are considered to be inherently trustworthy and therefore are self-authenticating. 62 These self-authenticating sources do
not need additional evidence to be admitted, provided they are relevant. 63 All evidence that does not fall into one of the eleven exceptions of self-authenticating sources described in Md. Rule 5-902(a)
requires that the party introducing the evidence make a prima facie

57. Cf. Propst v. State, 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968) (holding that a document was properly authenticated because the writings were taken from an accused pursuant to a lawful search, and stating that such a finding “seems inherent in the holding of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610 [(1963)],
and more particularly in Camphor v. State, 233 Md. 203, 196 A.2d 75 [(1963)]”). This
statement reveals a lack of clear standards regarding authentication of evidence. The logic
of the holding indicates exactly how lax the standards were because the Propst court held
that simply because a piece of paper was taken from the defendant, he was assumed to
have written it. Id.
58. 190 Md. 559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948).
59. Id. at 562–63, 59 A.2d 326.
60. See MD. R. 5-901, which only requires that a party show that the evidence is “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims” and
provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrations demonstrating authenticity.
61. MD. R. 5-901. Additionally, the process of authentication in Maryland courts is
identical in almost all respects to the federal method—the only exception being the
“comparison with authenticated specimens” method of authentication. In federal courts,
both the jury and the judge (if it is a bench trial) can compare the specimens. See FED. R.
EVID. 901(b)(3) (allowing “[a] comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert
witness or the trier of fact) (emphasis added). In Maryland, however, only an expert witness
or the judge in a bench trial may compare an authenticated specimen with an unauthenticated one to determine if they are the same. MD. R. 5-901(b)(3).
62. MD. R. 5-902(a)(1)–(6).
63. MD. R. 5-902(a).

2012]

GRIFFIN v. STATE

69

showing that the evidence is authentic. 64 This showing can be made
in one of nine suggested ways: testimony of a witness with knowledge;
non-expert opinion on handwriting; comparison with an authenticated specimen by the court or an expert; circumstantial evidence;
voice identification; a telephone conversation where the circumstances show that the call was authentic; public records; evidence that
the document is more than twenty years old and not suspicious; or a
showing that the document is the result of a process or system that
produces accurate results, 65 such as a breathalyzer test. If the court
determines that the party seeking to introduce the evidence meets its
burden of proving authenticity, then the document is admitted into
evidence. 66 In some cases, however, authenticity can be demonstrated
only if a condition of fact were found to be true; in these cases the
court must “admit [the evidence] upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that
the condition has been fulfilled.” 67
3. Authentication in the Maryland Rules of Evidence
The Maryland Rules of Evidence require “authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility” which “is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims.” 68 The Maryland Rules were adopted on
December 15, 1993, by the Maryland Court of Appeals and made effective on July 1, 1994. 69 The rules were derived from the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which were adopted on January 2, 1975, as an attempt to organize and update the common law rules of evidence. 70
Despite a change in the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence
with the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, the methods
and standards of authentication have remained consistent with common law principles. 71

64. Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 304–05, 768 A.2d 140, 145 (2001).
65. MD. R. 5-901(b).
66. MD. R. 5-901; MD. R. 5-104(a).
67. MD. R. 5-104(b).
68. MD. R. 5-901(a).
69. Adoption of Maryland Rules of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXV (1993).
70. Pub L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1943 (1975); see Adoption of Maryland Rules of
Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXVI (1993) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (“There has long been
a movement in this country towards codifying all areas of the law and away from the common law approach.”).
71. Compare MD. R. 5-901(a) (requiring evidence sufficient to support a finding of authenticity as a “condition precedent” to admissibility), with WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra
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Maryland courts generally have applied two principles in interpreting the authentication rules since their adoption: first, the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is instructive in the application of the Maryland rules; and second, the burden of proof for auauthentication is “slight,” requiring only “sufficient evidence that the
jury ultimately might [find that the evidence is what its proponent
claimed].” 72 Indeed, several authentication cases decided in Maryland since the adoption of the rules initially address the question of
authentication by considering the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 901, 73 which Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-901 greatly resembles. 74 Each of these cases also sets low authentication standards and
places a high level of trust in the jury’s ability to judge the trustworthiness of evidence presented. 75 The broad scope of possible authentication methods is emphasized in the rules themselves, which in addition to providing eleven possible types of self-authenticating sources
of evidence, 76 also explicitly state that the ten authentication methods
outlined in Maryland Rule 5-901 are included “[b]y way of illustration
only, and not by way of limitation.” 77
Maryland courts have broadly construed specific rules to apply
across a number of diverse factual situations. 78 For example, in Clark

note 47, at 694 (noting that authentication rules ensure that evidence is “sufficient to go to
the jury”).
72. Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007).
73. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 620–21, 28 A.3d 675, 681–82 (2011) (discussing the application of MD. R. 5-901(b)(3) and authentication by comparison with authenticated specimens in light of FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3)); Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927
A.2d at 37 (“Under Federal Rule 901, from which Maryland Rule 5-901 is derived, the burden of proof for authentication is slight, and the court ‘need not find that the evidence is
necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the
jury ultimately might do so.’” (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38
(D.D.C. 2006))).
74. Compare MD. R. 5-901 with FED. R. EVID. 901.
75. Miller, 421 Md. at 621, 28 A.3d at 682; Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37
(quoting Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 38).
76. MD. R. 5-902(a).
77. MD. R. 5-901(b).
78. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App. 54, 65–66, 773 A.2d 1087, 1094 (2001)
(authenticating a violent “written poem or rap song” allegedly written by the defendant
near the time of the murder after considering circumstantial evidence); Gerald v. State,
137 Md. App. 295, 304–05, 768 A.2d 140, 145–46 (2001) (holding that a letter was properly
authenticated using circumstantial evidence under Md. R. 5-901(b)(4)). In both of these
cases the court applied a single method of authentication, circumstantial evidence under
Md. R. 5-901(b)(4), to evaluate the evidence presented to the court, despite differing contexts, sources of circumstantial evidence, and possible other methods of authentication.
Bradshaw, 139 Md. App. at 65–66, 773 A.2d at 1094; Gerald, 137 Md. App. at 304–05, 768
A.2d at 145–46.
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v. State, 79 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals broadly applied authentication rules in a 2007 domestic battery case involving the authentication of 911 recordings from the victim that described the assailant and the nature of the assault. 80 The 911 call was authenticated
under Rule 5-901(b)(4), which permits “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics”
to substitute for direct testimony or evidence as to the authentication. 81 The woman on the 911 call identified herself as “Marsha
Thomas,” stated that her assailant had abused her and told the operator that she would be waiting for the police near the front desk of the
hotel in which she was staying. 82 Additionally, when police officers arrived at the hotel, they found a woman suffering from multiple injuries who had a driver’s license with the name “Marsha Thomas.” 83
The court found that this information provided sufficient “distinctive
characteristics” under 5-901(b)(4). 84
Even though Maryland has adopted formal rules of evidence,
many of the cases that consider authentication issues look to cases
handed down before the passage of the rules of evidence to determine whether or not the evidence presented is what its proponent
purports it to be. 85 While the courts have not looked to the common
law in every circumstance, 86 the influence of the early common law

79. 188 Md. App. 110, 981 A.2d 666 (2009).
80. Id. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 670–71.
81. MD. R. 5-904(b); Clark, 188 Md. App. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 670–71.
82. Id. at 119, 981 A.2d at 671.
83. Id.
84. Id.; MD. R. 5-901(b)(4). This rule is the descendent of the common law rule that
“sundry circumstances (including other admissions and the like) may suffice” to authenticate evidence where no direct testimony is possible. See also Knoedler v. State, 69 Md. App.
764, 772–74, 519 A.2d 811, 815 (1987) (holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to authenticate phone calls and records, and mitigate the possibility of fraud or imposition). The implication of this holding is that sufficient circumstantial evidence is enough
to overcome the minimal threshold for authentication and protect against the fear of
fraud or imposition, while still allowing the jury to determine the proper weight for the
evidence presented to it in the case.
85. See Clark, 188 Md. App. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 671 (citing and quoting Knoedler, 69
Md. App. at 772–74, 519 A.2d at 815); Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App. 54, 66, 773 A.2d
1087, 1094 (2001) (citing Gray v. State, 53 Md. App. 699, 456 A.2d 1290 (1983)). See also
Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 305, 768 A.2d 140, 145–46 (2001) (suggesting a “totality
of the circumstances” method of authentication not explicitly listed in the rules of evidence).
86. See, e.g., Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 225–28, 9 A.3d 99, 106–08 (2010)
(discussing the authentication of text messages without referencing the common law rules
for the authentication of evidence in Maryland).

72

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[Vol. 71:61

standards has played a significant role in how the Maryland courts
have interpreted authentication standards in the rules of evidence. 87
B. Authentication of Electronic Evidence
While the Maryland Court of Appeals has not adopted a formal
standard for authenticating electronic evidence, the Court of Special
Appeals has evaluated electronic evidence authentication issues in
much the same way it has considered non-electronic evidence cases. 88
The federal courts and other jurisdictions that have adopted similar
rules of evidence have considered electronic evidence in the authentication context and have established a relatively clear baseline for the
analysis of similar types of evidence under the existing rules of evidence. 89 Some courts in other states have explicitly stated that the
rules of evidence do not need to be supplemented to handle authentication of text messages, emails, social media, and the like.90
1. Application of Authentication Standards to Electronic Evidence in
Maryland
The Court of Appeals has never addressed the authentication of
electronic evidence and the lower Maryland courts have had only limited opportunities to consider how evidence from text messages, recovered cell phones, computers, websites, and other electronic
sources can be authenticated. 91 In 2007, in Dickens v. State, 92 the
Court of Special Appeals addressed the admissibility of a text message
that a defendant purportedly sent to the victim in a domestic murder
case. 93 The court found the text message was properly admitted because the defendant possessed the cell phone connected to the text
message at the time of his arrest, and the defendant had made verbal

87. For example, in Bradshaw, 139 Md. App. at 65–66, 773 A.2d, 1094, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals cited the common law precedent of Gray, 53 Md. App. 699, 426
A.2d. 1290, to analyze an authentication issue under the Maryland Rules.
88. See infra Part II.B.1.
89. See infra Part II.B.2.
90. See infra Part II.B.3.
91. Other than Griffin v. State, there have only been three published Maryland cases
dealing with authentication of “electronic communications,” none of which have dealt
with social media. Carpenter, 196 Md. App. at 225, 9 A.3d at 106 (addressing the authentication of information taken from a recovered cellular telephone); Dickens v. State, 175
Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (considering the authentication of text messag*
es); Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Md., No. 24-C-06-11462, 2007 WL 5997994, at 2 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (dealing with the authentication of a printout from a website).
92. 175 Md. App. 231, 927 A.2d 32 (2007).
93. Id. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37.
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statements contemporaneous with and similar to the text message in
question. 94 The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient
to meet the “slight” burden on the proponent of the evidence. 95
In Carpenter v. State, 96 the Court of Special Appeals found that
caller ID information, including the name of the caller and the time
of the phone call, recovered from a cell phone was properly authenticated where, along with additional circumstantial evidence, it was
proven that “when [the victim], after answering a call to the cell
phone, agreed to meet the caller at a gas station, the person who met
[the victim] at the gas station was [the defendant].” 97 In Carpenter,
the court adopted the Dickens standard for the authentication of evidence at trial, stating that because “the jury ‘could infer, legitimately,’
that [the defendant] made the calls missed and received by the cell
phone” the information was properly authenticated by the party seeking its introduction. 98
In Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Maryland, 99 Circuit Court Judge
W. Michel Pierson refused to admit a printout from the website
“wunderground.com” in the absence of additional authenticating information. 100 The website printout contained weather reports stating
that there was no precipitation in the location of the defendant’s
parking lots on the date of the plaintiff’s slip and fall. 101 The court rejected the website’s admission because the printout was unaccompanied by any other identifying evidence and lacked further information about the source. 102
2. Federal Case Law on the Authentication of Electronic Evidence
Federal courts have had numerous opportunities to address the
authentication of electronic evidence in recent years and have opted
to apply existing evidentiary standards in these cases. 103 The devel94. Id. at 239–40, 927 A.2d at 37.
95. Id. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 901) (quoting United States v.
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006)).
96. 196 Md. App. 212, 9 A.3d 99 (2010).
97. Id. at 219–20, 228, 9 A.3d at 103, 108.
98. Id. at 228, 9 A.3d at 108 (quoting Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37).
99. No. 24-C-06-11462, 2007 WL 5997994 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007).
*
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that federal courts have been “quick to reject calls to abandon the existing rules of evidence” for electronic information, but stating that “courts increasingly are demanding that
proponents of evidence obtained from electronically stored information pay more atten-
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opment of electronic authentication standards in the federal system
tracks closely to the historical origins of authentication standards with
an emphasis on a prima facie showing of authenticity and a focus on
the role of the jury in determining the relative weight to apply to evidence introduced by the parties and admitted by the court. 104 The
consideration of electronic evidence has generally followed the same
standards of authentication used for traditional forms of evidence. 105
In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 106 Chief Magistrate Judge
Paul W. Grimm described the authentication of electronic evidence as
“not a particularly high barrier to overcome” and noted that where
electronic evidence is not admitted, the “failure to authenticate . . .
almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation.” 107 The party seeking to introduce the exhibit must make a prima facie showing that the evidence is what he
says it is. 108 The court does not need to find that the evidence is what
its proponent claims it is, only that a reasonable jury might ultimately
do so. 109
Despite the similarities with the general approach to authentication of evidence, federal courts have noted that there is a duty to
properly scrutinize electronic evidence and that such evidence may
require higher levels of examination than traditional forms of evition to the foundational requirements than has been customary for introducing evidence
not produced from electronic sources”). In some ways, the consideration of “electronic
evidence” predates the modern concept of electronic communication, see, for example,
United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994), discussing the admissibility of radio telegrams.
104. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541–42 (discussing the prima facie threshold for authentication of evidence regardless of the origin or type of evidence). See also United States v.
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that the burden for authentication
is met by a prima facie showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims it to be).
105. Compare Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (stating that electronic evidence only requires a
prima facie showing of authenticity to be admitted), with First State Bank of Denton v. Md.
Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that to authenticate a phone call for
evidentiary purposes, the proponent need only “offer ‘sufficient authentication to make a
prima facie case that would allow the issue of identity to be decided by the jury” (quoting
United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir. 1974))).
106. 241 F.R.D. 534 (2007). In Lorraine, the Court dismissed the parties’ cross-claims for
summary judgment in a civil action to enforce an arbitration award because neither party
supported its affidavit with admissible relevant evidence. Id. at 534–35, 585. In writing the
Lorraine opinion, Judge Grimm provided a comprehensive overview of the process required to thoroughly vet electronic evidence prior to admitting it in a court proceeding.
Id. at 537–85.
107. Id. at 542.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 36, 38 (2006) (explaining that authentication requires only “that there is sufficient evidence that the jury might find that
the evidence is what it purports to be”).

2012]

GRIFFIN v. STATE

75

dence in some cases. 110 The analysis used by the courts, however, fits
within the existing rules of evidence, rather than limiting the consideration to certain types of methods to show authentication. 111
While a large number of cases in the federal system deal with
electronic evidence, 112 there are no federal cases that have addressed
the admissibility of evidence in the social media context. 113 The federal courts have, however, had the opportunity to consider social media in other contexts and have generally treated social media communication no differently than other forms of electronic evidence
when considering such evidence in a non-authentication context. 114
Courts have had the opportunity to consider several types of similar
factual circumstances: authentication of chat logs, 115 authentication of
postings to a public Internet forum, 116 and authentication of informa-

110. In re Vee Vinhee, 336 B.R. 437, 444–45 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005) (recognizing that
while the only difference between electronic and paper records is the format, the unique
nature of the electronic format “presents more complicated variations on the authentication problem than for paper records”).
111. For examples of federal courts applying traditional authentication methods while
considering whether a proper foundation had been laid for the admission of electronic
evidence, see United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing admissibility of exhibits reflecting chat room conversations); United States v. Simpson, 152
F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (analyzing authentication of chat room printouts in a
child pornography case); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (analyzing admissibility of the content of a website).
112. See supra note 111 for a list of several cases discussing electronic evidence in a nonsocial media context. See also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534 (discussing the applications of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to electronic evidence in general).
113. There are many cases where social media is considered in other contexts, most often commercial law, civil procedure, or free speech contexts. The facts of those cases,
however, very rarely turn on whether or not a specific piece of social media evidence is authentic and the issue of authenticity is rarely, if ever, addressed in those contexts. See, e.g.,
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing
the effect of the Stored Communications Act on subpoenas duces tecum served on Facebook, MySpace, and other social networking sites); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407
Md. 415, 419, 966 A.2d 432, 435 (2009) (finding that a circuit court judge abused his discretion when ordering that five anonymous Internet forum posters’ identities be revealed
in a defamation case, without discussing the authentication of electronic evidence).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 434 F. App’x 863, 871 (11th Cir. 2011) (analyzing
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 400, and admitting into evidence the partial music video taken from the defendant’s MySpace page in a Hobbs Act case with ten armed convenience
store robberies).
115. Tank, 200 F.3d at 630–31 (applying traditional rules of evidence and finding that
chat records were admissible in a child molestation case).
116. Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1231 (D. Kan. 2008) (holding that
postings to a message board at the website KUsports.com were admissible only to show the
declarants’ mental state but not for the truth of the matter asserted).
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tion posted directly to a website. 117 Despite these opportunities,
courts have not found it necessary to augment or change the existing
rules of evidence to deal with those very similar circumstances. 118
3. Authentication of Electronic Evidence in Other States
While Maryland and federal courts have not had the opportunity
to consider the authentication of evidence from a social media website, courts in several other jurisdictions have done so. A New York
court held, in People v. Clevenstine, 119 that chat logs from MySpace were
properly authenticated in a child molestation case where there was
testimony from both victims stating that they had spoken to the defendant online, the defendant’s wife testified that she had seen sexually explicit conversations on her husband’s MySpace account, the
messages were recovered from the victims’ computer, and a MySpace
employee testified that the message logs were created by a MySpace
chat. 120 The defendant’s claim that his account had been hacked was
found to present a factual issue for the jury and was not proper
grounds for appeal because it had not been asserted at trial. 121
In State v. Eleck, 122 the Connecticut Appellate Court held that the
defendant, who was convicted of assault, had failed to authenticate
the authorship of messages sent via Facebook that were introduced at
trial to impeach the victim witness for the State, who claimed she had
not spoken to the defendant. 123 The only authentication of the message printouts was the testimony of the defendant, who stated that he
had printed the messages from his computer and knew that the account which had sent the messages to him belonged to the victim. 124
Additionally, the victim denied sending the messages, claiming that

117. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D. Md. 2008) (finding that a printed
webpage from the Maryland Judiciary Case Search website is self-authenticating under
Rule 902(5)).
118. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that
courts have been “quick to reject calls to abandon the existing rules of evidence” when
dealing with electronic information); See also In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005) (applying existing authentication standards to Internet chat records and explicitly
declining to change the authentication rules for electronic evidence).
119. 891 N.Y.S.2d. 511, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
120. Id. at 514.
121. Id.
122. It is important to note that this case was decided after Griffin v. State and cites to
the Court of Appeals decision as persuasive authority. Id. at 823–24 (citing Griffin v. State,
419 Md. 343, 363–64, 19 A.3d 415 (2011)).
123. Id. at 819–20, 824.
124. Id. at 821.
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her account had been hacked. 125 The court, citing the Connecticut
Code of Evidence, 126 found that the information provided by the defendant was insufficient to authenticate the messages as having been
authored by the victim, especially in light of the fact that the victim
claimed her account had been “hacked.” 127
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 128 held that chat records from MySpace were
not properly authenticated in a murder trial where the only evidence
of authenticity was the testimony of a single witness who claimed to
have received the messages from the defendant’s brother’s account. 129
Unlike in Eleck, however, there was no testimony that the account was
hacked, rather the court found that because there was “no testimony . . . regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can access a
MySpace Web page, [or] whether codes are needed for access” the
messages were not properly authenticated. 130
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
pages allegedly printed from Barber’s MySpace profile were not
properly authenticated as per the Maryland Rules of Evidence, reversing the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 131 Judge Battaglia,
writing for the majority, reasoned that “[t]he potential for abuse and
manipulation of a social networking site by someone other than its
purported creator and/or user” required a higher level of authentication than the prosecution had provided. 132 The court held that the
information on the MySpace printout—a picture of Barber, along
with her birth date and location—“were not sufficient ‘distinctive characteristics’ to authenticate” the redacted printout. 133 The court fur125. Id. at 824.
126. CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 9-1(a) (which states, in relevant part, “the requirement of
authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to be”).
127. Eleck, 23 A.3d at 824. It is interesting to note that the court did not address this
issue as a matter of conditional relevance. There is conflicting evidence that the messages
were authentic—the court accepts that the messages came from the victim’s account, but
the consideration as to whether or not the account had, in fact, been “hacked” would seem
to be a matter for the jury to consider, and therefore, the messages should have been conditionally admitted under Conn. Code Evid. § 1-3(b).
128. 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010).
129. Id. at 1172.
130. Id.
131. 419 Md. 343, 347–48, 19 A.3d 415, 418 (2011).
132. Id. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 424.
133. Id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424.

78

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[Vol. 71:61

ther suggested three means by which social media evidence could be
authenticated, all of which impose a higher standard on social media
evidence than other types of evidence. 134
The court began its examination by restating a definition of social networking websites from an earlier case, in which such sites were
defined as “‘sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily provides information that the user wants to share with others.’” 135 The primary focus of the court’s analysis was the ease with
which an individual could establish a social network account under a
fictitious name or even assume the identity of another person by
fraudulently creating an account in another person’s name. 136 The
court reasoned that the “potential for fabricating or tampering with
electronically stored information on a social networking site . . . poses
significant challenges from the standpoint of authentication of printouts of the site.” 137
The court then discussed the Maryland rules governing authentication of evidence, noting that two possible rules could apply: Md.
Rule 5-901(b)(1), testimony of a witness with knowledge, and Md.
Rule 5-901(b)(4), circumstantial evidence. 138 The court noted that
this issue had not been considered previously in Maryland courts. 139
The court continued its analysis of related opinions from other
jurisdictions by noting that several courts have “suggested greater
scrutiny” for authentication of electronic evidence due to “the heightened possibility for manipulation by other than the true user or post-

134. Id. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28. The three suggested means of authentication are:
(1) asking the purported creator if he created the posting in question; (2) using computer
forensics to examine a computer’s Internet history and hard drive to determine whether a
specific computer created the content in question; and (3) obtaining information directly
from the social networking site in question. Id. These suggestions impose a higher standard than is articulated in the Maryland Rules of Evidence, which allow authentication of
all types of evidence by circumstantial evidence alone, or by testimony of any witness with
knowledge. MD. R. 5-901(b)(1), (4).
135. Id. at 351, 19 A.3d at 420 (quoting Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415,
424 n.3, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (2009)). The court also noted that MySpace, like other social networking sites, allows members to share photos, videos, and other information on
personal web pages. Id. (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp.2d 843, 845 (W.D.
Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008)).
136. Griffin, 419 Md. at 352, 19 A.3d at 421. The court noted that one Boston-based Internet company had succeeded in obtaining nearly 200 Facebook “friends” for an account
created in the name of a toy frog called “Freddi Staur.” Id. at 353–54, 19 A.3d at 421 (citing Samantha L. Miller, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy
on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542 (2009)).
137. Griffin, 419 Md. at 354, 19 A.3d at 422.
138. Id. at 354–55, 19 A.3d at 422.
139. Id. at 355, 19 A.3d at 422.
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er.” 140 The court, however, did draw a distinction between emails, instant messages, and text messages, on the one hand, and information
posted on social networking or other websites, on the other, noting
that the dangers of emails and similar communications are markedly
reduced because they are intended for a limited number of recipients
rather than the public at large. 141 In the end, the court suggested
three possible ways to authenticate printouts from social networking
sites. 142
After reciting the facts of the case, the court determined that, because the prosecution had only offered limited evidence pertaining to
the origin of the profile (the photo on the profile page of Barber and
the purported location and birth date of the owner of the page), the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient “distinctive characteristics” to
properly authenticate the MySpace printouts. 143
The court explicitly stated that, despite the prosecution’s failure
to authenticate the posting in this case, printouts from social media
sites were not de facto inadmissible. 144 Rather, the court suggested a
non-exhaustive list of three potential methods for authenticating social networking printouts: (1) testimony from the purported creator
affirming that he had created the content; (2) forensic evidence from
the computer of the purported creator; and (3) information about
the creation of the content from the social networking site itself. 145
None of these methods were used to authenticate the MySpace printout in this case. 146
The court found that, because the prosecution had described
Gibbs as its “most important witness” and highlighted the importance
of the “snitches get stitches” posting in its closing argument, the trial

140. Id. at 358–61, 19 A.3d at 424–26. Specifically, the court discussed the decisions of
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010), People v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d.
588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), and United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000), in noting the higher level of scrutiny that other courts had placed on electronic evidence from
social networking sites. In all those cases, the courts found that the electronic evidence
that was presented for admission was not properly authenticated due to a fear of fabrication or falsification. The court distinguished In Re F.P., 878 A.2d 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005),
a case involving authentication of instant message chat, on the grounds that it was “unpersuasive in the context of a social networking site, because the . . . recipient [identified] his
own distinctive characteristics,” which was not the case in Griffin. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361,
19 A.3d at 426.
141. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13.
142. Id. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28.
143. Id. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 423–24.
144. Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.
145. Id. at 363–64, 19 A.3d at 427–28.
146. See id. at 348–50, 19 A.3d at 418–19.
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court’s admission into evidence of the improperly authenticated
MySpace printouts was reversible error. 147
Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Murphy, dissented, arguing that
the information presented by the prosecution—the photo of Ms. Barber and the defendant, Ms. Barber’s birth date on the printout, a description of the purported creator of the website as a 23-year-old
woman from Port Deposit, and references to freeing “Boozy”—were
sufficient to authenticate the printout. 148 The dissent further argued
that the Court of Appeals should have adopted the “reasonable juror”
standard articulated by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Dickens v. State, 149 which states evidence should be admitted where there is
enough information such that a reasonable juror could find the evidence presented to be authentic. 150 Judge Harrell argued that the
“technological heebie jeebies” discussed in the majority opinion—the
possibility of manipulation or abuse—should go to the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility. 151
IV. ANALYSIS
In Griffin v. State, the Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the
existing rules of evidence—authentication, specifically—with the rapid development of electronic communication, suggesting that separate rules of authentication should be applied to social media evidence used at trial. 152 The court’s suggestion that social media
evidence should be subject to a separate, higher level of authentication does not comport with the existing rules of evidence or the
common-law origins of authentication standards. 153 Furthermore,
under the existing rules of authentication, the prosecution provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to admit the
MySpace printout. 154

147. Id. at 362–63, 19 A.3d at 427.
148. Griffin, 419 Md. at 365, 367, 19 A.3d at 428–29 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
149. 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (quoting United States v. Safavian,
435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006)) (stating that “the burden of proof for authentication is slight”).
150. Griffin, 419 Md. at 366–67, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Dickens,
175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A,2d at 37).
151. Id. at 367, 927 A.2d at 430.
152. See supra Part III.
153. See infra Part IV.A.
154. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Social Media Evidence Does Not Require Separate Authentication
Standards
The court incorrectly concluded that social media evidence requires separate authentication standards. This conclusion was incorrect because, while social media evidence does pose a risk of possible
manipulation or fraud, this risk is not more present in social media
evidence than it is in other forms of evidence, electronic or otherwise. 155 Furthermore, the authentication methods suggested by the
court for social media evidence fit within the existing authentication
framework, thus there is no need to create a separate process of authentication specifically for this type of evidence. 156 Finally, the rules
of evidence and the common-law precedent for authentication do not
support the court’s decision to establish a more stringent set of authentication standards solely for social media evidence. 157
1. Social Media Is Not Distinguishable from Other Forms of
Electronic Communication
The court’s primary grounds for distinguishing social media
from other forms of electronic evidence was that social media is an
inherently insecure method of communication that can be easily fabricated. 158 While social media significantly changed the landscape of
online communication, these changes are superficial from an authentication standpoint. 159 The court’s distinction fails to consider that
the two methods of fabrication or tampering mentioned by the
court—“hacking” into a social media account or creating a false account on behalf of someone else—are at least as easy to accomplish
with email and chat communication as they are with social media ac155. See infra Part IV.A.1.
156. See infra Part IV.A.2.
157. See infra Part IV.A.3.
158. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 361 n.13, 19 A.3d 415, 426 n.13 (2011).
159. The major contribution of sites like Facebook, MySpace, Friendster, Google+, LinkedIn, and Twitter has been a new ability to “friend,” “follow,” or “link” with other users to
share personal, social, and professional information, or pass along an interesting bit of
news. While this development has certainly changed with whom and how people communicate and the topics they communicate about, these social media developments have not
changed much that would affect the central inquiry of an authentication issue: Is this evidence actually from the person its proponent claims it is? The question of authorship is
central to determining the authenticity of any written statement, and as far as authorship is
concerned the possibility of “fraud or imposition” is not very different in the social media
context than it is in context of email or any other method of online communication. This
is especially true where the security measures to protect email and social media accounts
are often very similar, if not exactly the same (as is the case with Google’s email and social
media services).

82

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[Vol. 71:61

counts because the security of these applications are largely similar. 160
The court found that online chat communication differed from the
postings on a social networking site because the victim identified the
distinctive characteristics in the chat records in In re F.P.(references in
the chat record to the first name of the defendant, personal threats
made by the defendant, and reference to the high school where the
children attended) as the reason why he knew with whom he was
communicating. 161 In Griffin, however, the police sergeant who
printed the MySpace page listed the distinctive characteristics of the
profile that led him to believe that it belonged to Barber, and these
characteristics were stipulated to by both parties, though the parties
disagreed with how these facts affected authenticity. 162
The similarities drawn between the nonbinding case law cited by
the court and the facts of Griffin do not support the court’s finding in
this case. While Commonwealth v. Williams and Griffin v. State bear
some superficial similarities, as both are murder cases with evidence
from MySpace, the “distinctive characteristics” identified in Griffin—a
photo of Barber and Griffin, references to the defendant and their
child, as well as Barber’s birth date, city of residence, and a direct reference to the case 163—are far more significant than the testimony of
the one witness in Williams, who claimed that the messages she received were from the defendant’s brother. 164 The facts of People v. Lenihan, 165 a New York murder case in which the defendant appealed
because the trial judge refused to allow cross examination based on
photos from MySpace, are similarly unpersuasive. Lenihan dealt with
photographs that, while printed from MySpace, could have been doctored or altered regardless of their source in the manner suggested by

160. For example, compare the account creation procedures at Gmail
(mail.google.com/mail/signup), Yahoo (new.mail.yahoo.com/addresses), Facebook
(http://www.facebook.com), and MySpace (https://www.myspace.com/signup), all of
which require a user name and password to be created and have similar protocols for determining password security. For a discussion of relative password security, see Dennis
Guster et al., Weak Password Security: An Empirical Study, 17 INFO. SEC. J.: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 45, 45–46 (2008). The conventional wisdom that average password security is
weak has been proven to be accurate, regardless of the type of website for which the password is used. See Dinei Florêncio & Cormac Herley, A Large-Scale Study of Web Password
Habits (2007), http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/74164/www2007.pdf (noting that
users “frequently re-use passwords across multiple sites”).
161. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361, 19 A.3d at 426 (discussing In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005)).
162. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419.
163. Id. at 349, 357, 19 A.3d at 418–19, 424.
164. Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d. 1162, 1171–72 (Mass. 2010).
165. 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
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the judge in that case. 166 United States v. Jackson, 167 a wire fraud and
obstruction of justice case where the defendant was alleged to have
defrauded the United Parcel Service and racially harassed numerous
prominent African-Americans, is also not an appropriate or persuasive
authority in this case because the court discussed the authentication
issue in dicta as the evidence was not admissible on other grounds. 168
Furthermore, in all three cases, the court assumed facts that were
not presented into evidence in Griffin—the possibility of a user other
than the owner of the account in Commonwealth v. Williams, 169 the
threat of photo-doctoring in Lenihan, 170 and the fraudulent creation
of web postings in Jackson 171—as its basis for finding that the information was not authentic. Even if these facts had been part of the
record, however, the proper resolution of the discrepancy would have
been to conditionally admit the evidence and allow the jury to determine which arguments were more credible. 172 In this case, there was
no information in the record that supported the court’s suggestion
that the account was fabricated or falsified in some manner. 173
Finally, the court ignored several appropriate comparisons when
it sought to distinguish social media evidence from other forms of
electronic evidence. For example, the majority addressed the authentication of emails only in a footnote, stating that “authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those involving a
MySpace profile and posting printout, because such correspondence
is sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients,
rather than published for all to see.” 174 The suggestion that the intended recipient has a bearing on the authenticity of the communication is not supported by the structure of the rules of evidence, which
do not limit possible methods of authentication based on the origin
of the evidence. 175 The court failed to consider the fact that the pri-

166. Id. at 592.
167. 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000).
168. Id. at 635, 637–38.
169. 926 N.E.2d at 1172.
170. 911 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
171. 208 F.3d at 638.
172. FED. R. EVID. 104(b); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 539–40 (D.
Md. 2007).
173. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 357–58, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 (2011).
174. Id. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13.
175. See MD. R. 5-901(b) (“By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements
of this Rule.”) (emphasis added). There are rules which allow additional means of au-
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mary risk considered by the court, “manipulation . . . by someone
other than [the] purported creator and/or user,” is shared equally
between email and social networking sites.176 There are numerous
cases dealing with the authentication of emails, and despite almost
identical security and access mechanisms between the two platforms,
courts have generally applied the traditional authentication rules,
without modification, to email authentication questions. 177
While the court is correct that text messages are more difficult to
falsify, 178 since they are always associated with a phone number that
can usually be connected to an owner, 179 there still exists the possibility that a given message could be fraudulent if the phone is shared
among multiple individuals, stolen, or left unattended—a fact not
suggested in the consideration of the authentication of text messages
in Dickens v. State. 180 The risk of fraudulent or falsified communications being presented at trial exists regardless of the medium of
communication; for example, text messages can be faked, online accounts can be hacked, and signatures can be forged. 181 The suggestion that social media and only social media requires a higher level of
scrutiny reinterprets the rules of evidence in a way that is not consistent with their plain meaning and application. 182

thentication based on the source of the evidence, but these rules do not limit authentication of that type of evidence to that method. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-901(b)(5) (allowing identification of a voice by a witness who has previously heard the voice “at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker,” without differentiating between public
and private contexts).
176. Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424; see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38–40 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing
the admissibility of emails in a motion in limine prior to a wire fraud and corruption case
and finding that the emails had been properly authenticated under the Federal Rules of
Evidence where there were distinctive characteristics, such as email addresses and signatures, for the sender to be identified).
178. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13.
179. See Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 238, 927 A.2d 32, 36 (2007) (authenticating
text messages based on the sender’s telephone number).
180. 175 Md. App. 231, 238–40, 927 A.2d 32, 36–37 (2007).
181. For a recent example of the threat posed by falsification of electronic evidence on
phone, see Mike Scarcella, Defense Lawyers Seek iPhone 3G in Conspiracy Prosecution, L. TECH.
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1202537995906#.
182. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007) (noting
that the Federal Rules of Evidence “apply to computerized data” and that Rule 102 contemplated flexibility to address technological developments) (quoting MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.447 (4th ed. 2004))).
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2. The New Methods of Authentication for Social Media Evidence
Proposed by the Court Could Be Applied Easily Within Existing
Authentication Standards
The Griffin court’s suggested means for the authentication of social media—testimony from the purported creator, searching the
computer of the purported creator of the social media account, and
obtaining information directly from the social networking website—
are valid suggestions for possible methods of authentication. 183 The
rules of evidence do not posit an exclusive list of possible methods for
authentication. 184 Indeed, the methods suggested in Griffin fit well
within the established guidelines in the rules. Statements by either
the purported creator or an individual from the social networking
website are testimony of a witness with knowledge, 185 and any data recovered from the purported creator’s computer or the social networking site itself is circumstantial evidence that the evidence is what the
party presenting the evidence purports it to be. 186
Furthermore, the methods outlined by the court are unnecessarily specific and fail to discuss other traditional methods of authentication that could be sufficient to meet the burden of authentication
imposed by the rules. 187 Testimony from the alleged creator of the
social media content would certainly be sufficient for authentication. 188 In many circumstances, however, testimony from another individual could be just as valuable, especially where, as in People v. Clevenstine and In Re F.P., the individual is familiar with the writing style
of the alleged creator of the content. Therefore, this individual can
verify independently that the alleged poster did in fact post the con-

183. Griffin, 419 Md. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28.
184. MD. R. 5-901(b) (stating “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this Rule”).
185. MD. R. 5-901(b)(1).
186. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4). For a discussion of the use of hash tags and metadata in authentication decisions, see Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm’s discussion in Lorraine, 241
F.R.D. at 546–48, which explains how data from a computer or website can be used to
demonstrate the “distinctive characteristics” of the electronic evidence.
187. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 363–64, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (2011). The court notes
that Griffin should not be read to “suggest that printouts from social networking sites
should never be admitted,” stating that possible avenues of authentication will “continue
to develop” and suggesting three “authentication opportunities” for social media evidence.
Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.
188. MD. R. 5-901(b)(1).
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tent because he witnessed the posting first hand, or the posting is
consistent with other statements or actions by the poster. 189
In addition to testimonial evidence, as the court notes, physical
evidence could be used to authenticate the posting, whether from the
website host, Internet service provider, or the hard drive of the computer from which the information was posted. 190 This physical evidence could be supplemented or replaced by circumstantial evidence
surrounding the posting or page, such as photos, other communications with friends around the same time, non-social media communications which support the assertion that the poster would have been
likely to make those comments, or evidence that the postings were in
fact made from the same physical location. 191
3. The Historical Precedents for Authentication Do Not Support the
Addition of Restrictive Standards Proposed by the Court
The authentication rules are rooted in common-law precedent
that allows relatively lax standards to show whether the evidence in
192
The standards are purposequestion is what its proponent claims.
fully lax because authentication is a threshold issue, and the ultimate
determination as to the trustworthiness of the evidence is made by the
jury who decides how much weight to give to the evidence presented
by the parties. 193 A long history of Maryland case law from prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports the treatment
of authentication as a threshold issue, with only a minimal burden of
proof required. 194 In Lauder v. State, 195 the Court of Appeals allowed a
price tag, which was not attached to merchandise at the time of trial,
189. People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d. 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), provides an example of the value of testimony from individuals other than the creator. In that case, the
court found that sexually explicit communications between the defendant and two minor
children defendant was alleged to have raped was properly authenticated where there was
testimony from both victims and the defendant’s wife as to the communications at issue.
Id. This was also the case in In Re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), in which
the court found that testimony from the victim stating he had engaged in online communications with the defendant was properly authenticated where the victim explained that
the defendant identified himself to the victim, referenced personal interaction between
the two boys, and mentioned the high school they both attended. Id.
190. Griffin, 419 Md. at 363–64, 19 A.3d at 427–28.
191. See MD. R. 5-901(b)(4) (stating “[c]ircumstantial evidence, such as appearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics” that
demonstrate the validity of the evidence are acceptable means of authentication).
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Hilton, 363 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2004).
194. See supra Part II.A.1.
195. 233 Md. 142, 144, 195 A.2d 610, 611 (1963).

2012]

GRIFFIN v. STATE

87

to be admitted into evidence as proof of the price of a stolen object
despite a lack of supporting evidence as to its trustworthiness. 196
Propst v. State, 197 which held that writings taken from a person’s home
are authentic by virtue of the fact that they were recovered from that
individual without “any further proof of genuineness,” further demonstrates the lax authentication standards in Maryland’s common
law. 198
These lax standards have carried forward into the modern era
and been applied by Maryland courts in cases dealing with electronic
evidence. 199 In both Maryland appellate decisions addressing the admissibility of electronic evidence prior to Griffin, specifically Dickens v.
State and Carpenter v. State, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated authentication’s role as a threshold issue at trial. 200 While this standard
has not been adopted formally by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
such a standard has been adopted in federal cases, 201 and such a standard is “almost direct authority impacting our construction of a Maryland analog rule.” 202 By suggesting that social media evidence exclusively should be subjected to higher standards and limited methods of
authentication, the court failed to consider the role of the jury in
judging the relative value of evidence and imposed an unnecessary
burden on parties seeking to prove the authenticity of social media
evidence by forcing litigants to follow separate rules for this narrow,
but increasingly important, 203 source of evidence. 204
196. Id.
197. 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968).
198. Id.
199. See supra Part II.B.1.
200. Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 228, 9 A.3d 99, 108 (2010) (reiterating the
position adopted in Dickens and stating that, where “the jury ‘could infer, legitimately,’ that
[the defendant] made the calls missed and received by the cell phone,” the evidence was
admissible at trial); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (analogizing to the comparable federal rule, stating that the burden for authentication under
Federal Rule 901 is “slight”).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994)) (explaining that the standard
for authentication of evidence at trial is “slight” and intended as a threshold issue).
202. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 365–66, 19 A.3d 415, 428–29 (2011) (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 543, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987)).
203. For a discussion of the rise of social media evidence in lawsuits, see Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of A Trial With Social Media and the Internet, 11 J. INTERNET L. 1, 9 (2011).
204. See Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance
Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Evidence, 42 AKRON L. REV.
357, 366–68 (2009) (discussing the low bar for authentication of evidence at trial, regardless of the source of the evidence but noting that “[a]s electronic evidence becomes more
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel give more in
terms of authentication”).
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B. The Court’s Decision to Exclude the MySpace Post Is Not Supported by
Existing Rules of Evidence or Traditional Authentication Procedures
The Griffin court excluded the MySpace printout from evidence
because the “potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site by someone other than its purported creator and/or user . . . requires a greater degree of authentication” than was provided
at trial. 205 This holding is not supported by a plain reading of the
Maryland Rules of Evidence, 206 nor does persuasive authority from
other jurisdictions support such a holding in a manner that comports
with established evidentiary principles in Maryland. 207
1. A Plain Reading of the Maryland Rules of Evidence Does Not
Support the Majority’s Holding That the MySpace Printout Was
Not Properly Authenticated at Trial
The Maryland Rules of Evidence state that “[t]he requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.” 208 This showing can
be made through multiple methods. 209 In Griffin, the parties stipulated to facts that constituted circumstantial evidence that the posting
was made by Barber. 210 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for showing evidence authenticity when its “appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics” show
that “the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” 211 In this case,
the parties stipulated that a police sergeant would testify that the
MySpace page contained a photograph which was recognizably Jessica
Barber, a date of birth that matched Barber's, the statement “FREE
BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U
KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!," and that Barber is the defendant’s live-in
fiancée. 212 These identifying and distinctive characteristics are sufficient to meet the minimal burden of authentication required in Mary-

205. Griffin, 419 Md. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 424 (majority opinion).
206. See infra Part IV.B.1.
207. See infra Part IV.B.2.
208. MD. R. 5-901(a).
209. MD. R. 5-901(b).
210. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419–20.
211. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).
212. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419–20. The page also listed the account
owner’s hometown as “Port Deposit, Maryland,” which is the location Barber gave as her
home, but that fact was not in the sergeant’s stipulated testimony or presented to the jury.
Id.
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land because the circumstantial evidence demonstrates “that the evidence is what it is claimed to be.” 213 Indeed, the majority does not
dispute these facts, but rather assumes facts about the possible “abuse
and manipulation” of the MySpace posting which were not part of the
appellate record in this case. 214 Even if such evidence of manipulation were offered at trial, the determination of authenticity then
would become an issue of fact to be decided by the jury under the
rules for conditional relevance. 215 While the Court of Appeals noted
that it was not asked to consider conditional relevance in this case, 216
it could have ruled sua sponte that conditional relevance was the proper means to resolve this evidentiary discrepancy.
2. Persuasive Authority Suggests That the MySpace Printout Was
Properly Admitted at Trial
Federal and state courts that have addressed the admissibility of
electronic evidence generally have applied the same rules of authentication to the electronic evidence as used for non-electronic evidence. 217 In the cases in which the party seeking to introduce the evidence at trial provided supporting facts showing that the offered
evidence is what it purports to be, courts allowed the evidence to be
admitted at trial. 218 Where courts determined that the evidence was
not properly authenticated, lack of authentication was generally pre213. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).
214. See Brief for the Petitioner, at 10–20, Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415
(2011) (No. 74), 2010 WL 5096820, at *10–20 (Md. Nov. 4, 2010) (failing to provide specific evidence that the page was falsified or “hacked,” but stating that the State had not met
its burden of persuasion and failed to cite evidence in the record that showed or argued
the page was a fake).
215. MD. R. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the condition has been fulfilled.”).
216. Griffin, 419 Md. at 365 n.15, 19 A.3d at 428 n.15.
217. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007)
(explaining that electronic evidence does not require new authentication standards); In Re
F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95–96 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2005) (declining to apply new evidentiary standards
to electronic evidence).
218. See, e.g., Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (finding
that text messages admitted at trial were properly authenticated by a showing that the
phone number belonged to the defendant and that the content of the messages were consistent with the proposition that they were sent by the defendant); People v. Clevenstine,
891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding that authentication standards were
met as to MySpace chat records in a rape case in which both victims testified that they had
chatted with the defendant on MySpace, the message records were retrieved from the victims’ hard drive, a MySpace representative testified that the messages had been exchanged
on the MySpace network, and the defendant’s wife recalled seeing a sexually explicit message when viewing the defendant’s MySpace account).
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mised on one of two grounds: either the court finding that the evidence was not sufficient to meet the low burden of authentication 219
or the court assuming that the risk of falsification of electronic evidence requires a higher standard of proof from evidence offered
from such sources. 220 The cases premised on falsification risk, however, do not comport with authentication standards in the Maryland
Rules of Evidence, which do not provide for higher authentication
standards based on a higher possibility of falsification. 221 The majority
in Griffin held that the information presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to meet authentication standards on its own, and further
ruled that because of the greater risk of “abuse and manipulation” inherent in social networking sites, the evidence was not sufficiently authentic. 222 This holding and the subsequent extension of authentication standards are not supported by the existing rules of evidence and
common law authentication standards in Maryland.
V. CONCLUSION
In Griffin v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland enunciated a
new standard for the authentication of evidence from social networking websites. 223 The court created three authentication methods for
social networking evidence that are not supported by the existing
rules of evidence in Maryland. 224 Nor is the result in Griffin supported
by a plain reading of the existing rules of evidence, Maryland case law,
or persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. 225 The court over219. See, e.g., Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Md., No. 24-C-06-11462 OT, 2007 WL
5997994, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (finding that evidence from a weather website
was not properly authenticated because it contained no relevant identifying characteristics
other than a URL printed on the page and no additional “information about the source”
was provided to the court).
220. See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824–25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (finding that messages sent via Facebook were not properly authenticated after citing the inherent risks of falsification or fraud in online communication); Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d.
1162, 1171–73 (Mass. 2010) (finding that the authentication of chat records from MySpace
was insufficient in a murder case because there was no evidence that the owner of the
MySpace account sent the messages, despite testimony from a witness stating that she knew
it was the owner of the account who sent the messages).
221. MD. R. 5-901(a). This can be compared to relevancy, for which the rules specifically define certain types of evidence which is admissible for one purpose and not another.
See, for example, MD. R. 5-408, which does not allow settlement offers in civil matters to be
admitted into evidence to prove the validity, invalidity, or amount of civil damages, but
allows settlement offers to be admitted for other reasons, such as witness bias.
222. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 358, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (2011).
223. Id. at 357–58, 363–64, 19 A.3d at 423–24, 427–28.
224. See supra Part IV.A and note 134.
225. See supra Part IV.B.

2012]

GRIFFIN v. STATE

91

reached in treating social media evidence as different from other
forms of evidence and, in so doing, disregarded state and federal
rules of evidence.

